

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL  
RELATIONS

CLARK COLLEGE

Worcester, Mass.

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A Preliminary Syllabus  
for a Study of

The Issues of the  
Present War

PART I  
HISTORICAL



Prepared

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# THE ISSUES OF THE PRESENT WAR

## I. GERMANIC ORIGINS

1. The "Aryan myth."
2. Primitive nature of German society at the close of the 5th century A.D.
3. The Freeman-Kemble-Green-Burgess fiction respecting the Germanic origins of modern democracy and of the peculiar political capacity of the Germans.

## II. THE MEDIEVAL GERMANIC STATES

1. Charlemagne's Empire.
2. The Holy Roman Empire.
  - A. The lure of Ancient Rome.
  - B. Effect of the policies of the Medieval Empire on the formation of a German national state.
  - C. The influence of the Empire on German historical and political traditions.
3. The failure to establish a German national state in medieval or early modern times.
  - A. Backwardness as compared with France, England, and Spain.
  - B. Increasing impotence of the Medieval Empire.
  - C. Consequences of the delayed origin of a German national state.

## III. THE RISE OF PRUSSIA

1. Brandenburg before 1415.
2. The Hohenzollerns prior to 1415.
3. The sale of the Margraviate of Brandenburg to the Hohenzollern Burgrave of Nuremberg by the Emperor Sigismund, 1415.
  - A. Frederik of Nuremberg, the first Hohenzollern Margrave of Brandenburg, 1415-40.
4. The Evolution of the Margraviate of Brandenburg into the Kingdom of Prussia, 1415-1701.
  - A. Prussia and the Teutonic Knights, 1231-1618.
    - (1) Hohenzollern domination of the Knights and control of Prussia.
  - B. Personal union of Brandenburg and Prussia, 1618.
  - C. The work of Frederik William the Great Elector, 1640-88.
    - (1) The "foundations of Prussian policy."
  - D. The Kingdom of Prussia, 1701.
    - (1) Why Kingdom of Prussia and not of Brandenburg.
    - (2) Submergence of Brandenburg in Prussia.

IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRUSSIA INTO A EUROPEAN POWER AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PRUSSIAN HEGEMONY IN GERMANY.

1. Great expansion of Prussian power and prestige in the eighteenth century.
  - A. Frederick William I, 1713-40.
    - (1) Perfection of the military state.
    - (2) Growth of administrative bureaucracy.
    - (3) Paternalistic despotism.
  - B. Frederick the Great, 1740-86, and the first humiliation of Austria by Prussia.
    - (1) *Realpolitik*.
      - a. The violation of the Pragmatic Sanction and the seizure of Silesia.
      - b. Desertion of his allies, 1745.
      - c. Partition of Poland, 1772.
    - (2) Salvation of Prussia by England and Russia.
    - (3) The Hohenzollerns become the peers of the Hapsburgs.
    - (4) Reasons why Prussia did not form a national German state, 1763-1800.
    - (5) German dualism, 1763-1866.
2. The decline and humiliation of Prussia.
  - A. Inferior character of the Hohenzollerns from Frederick the Great to William I, 1786-1860.
  - B. Tendency to rest on laurels and prestige of Frederick the Great.
  - C. The lapse of Prussian militarism.
  - D. The Napoleonic conquest, 1806.
3. The War of the Liberation and the Regeneration of Prussia.
  - A. The administrative and economic reforms of Stein and Hardenberg.
  - B. The military reform of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.
  - C. The rise of Prussian nationalism—Arndt and Fichte.
  - D. The War of the Liberation and the overthrow of Napoleon, 1813.

Required:—

J. H. Robinson and C. A. Beard, *Development of Modern Europe*, vol. I, pp. 23-28, 55-79, 336-8; or C. J. H. Hayes, *A Political and Social History of Modern Europe*, vol. I, pp. 10-14, 342-4, 347-62, 555-7.

Suggested:—

J. A. Marriott and C. G. Robertson, *The Evolution of Prussia*, pp. 11-255.

4. The attempts to form a liberal German national state under Prussian leadership, 1815-1860.
  - A. Efforts to achieve political unity.

- (1) Impossibility of adjusting and reconciling Austro-Prussian dualism and German national unity.
- (2) The system of Metternich and the defeat of nationalism and democracy in Germany, 1815-1848.
  - a. The "punctation" of Töplitz, July, 1819.
  - b. The Carlsbad Decrees, September, 1819.
  - c. The Vienna *Schlussakte*, May 24, 1820.
  - d. The "Six Articles" June 28, 1832.
- (3) The Revolution of 1848.
  - a. The forces leading to the Revolution.
    - (1) Growth of middle class liberalism.
    - (2) The Prussian constitutional crisis of 1847.
    - (3) The revolutions of 1848 in France, Italy and Austria.
  - b. The plan for a united constitutional German state.
    - (1) The Heidelberg *Vorparlament* of March 31 to April 4, 1848.
    - (2) The Frankfort Parliament, May 18, 1848 to June 18, 1849.
      - (a) Its sessions and program.
      - (b) Its humiliating failure.
    - (3) The *Dreikönigsbündnis* and the Erfurt Parliament, March, 1850.
    - (4) Prince Felix Schwarzenberg and the "humiliation of Olmütz," November, 1850.
  - e. Tragic significance of the failure of the liberal movement for unification in Germany—the discrediting of liberalism.

Required:—

Hayes, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 13-14, 125-6, 131-2, 135-6, 141-4; or C. D. Hazen, *Europe Since 1815*, pp. 28-44, 145-52, 169-86; or J. S. Schapiro, *Modern and Contemporary European History*, pp. 115-44.

B. Economic unity under Prussian leadership—the *Zollverein*.

(1) The economic impulse to political unity.

(2) The precedent of Prussian economic leadership.

Required:—

Hayes, II, pp. 95-7, 125; or Hazen, pp. 146-9; or Schapiro, pp. 126-8.

5. Bismarck, "Blood and Iron," and the formation of the Prussianized German Empire.

A. The German intellectuals favoring Prussian Leadership.

(1) The Prussian school of historians and political scientists.

B. The military plans of William I and their object.

C. The rejection of the new military program by the Prussian Parliament and the resulting constitutional crisis.

D. Bismarck called as the "parliament tamer."

E. "Blood and Iron," and the revival of *Realpolitik*.

- (1) The completion of the army program.
  - (2) The plans for a military and autocratic unification of Germany.
    - a. The Schleswig-Holstein affair and its complications.
    - b. The Austro-Prussian war of 1866 and the final humiliation of Austria.
      - (1) The end of German dualism.
      - (2) Undisputed supremacy of Prussia in Germany.
  - (3) The North German Federation, 1867-71.
    - a. The dominant position of Prussia.
  - (4) Necessity for another foreign war to weld the South German States to the Northern Federation.
    - a. The Hohenzollern candidature and the Spanish crown.
      - (1) The mission of Lothar Bucher to Madrid.
    - b. The dispute with France—the "Ems telegram."
    - c. The Franco-Prussian War and the alliance with South Germany.
- F. Formation of the German Empire, 1871.
- (1) Dominant position of Prussian power and policy and of Bismarck as imperial chancellor and president of the Prussian ministry.

Required:—

Hayes, II, pp. 180-206; or Hazen, pp. 240-71, 285-302; or Schapiro, pp. 169-194.

#### V. THE PRUSSIANIZING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE, 1870-1890.

1. The new imperial constitution.
2. The consolidating laws.
3. The adoption of the Prussian military system in the Empire.
  - A. Continuance of "Parliament taming."
4. The persecution and repression of dissident groups.
  - A. The *Kulturkampf*.
  - B. Struggle with Social Democracy.
  - C. The repressed nationalities and dynasties.
5. Autocracy and bureaucracy as opposed to Parliamentary institutions.
6. Benevolent despotism and social legislation.
  - A. Military background.
  - B. Paternalistic aims.
  - C. Opposition of the Liberals.
7. Persistence of Agrarian domination—"Junkerdom."

Required:—

Hayes, II, pp. 397-415; or Hazen, pp. 303-22; or Robinson and Beard, II, pp. 130-147; or Schapiro, pp. 277-297; and Hazen, *The Government of Germany*.

## VI. THE STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE FOR THE HEGEMONY OF EUROPE

1. Important consequences of the method of achieving German unity from 1860-1871.
  - A. Prestige of militarism and autocracy and corresponding eclipse of liberalism and pacific adjustments.
  - B. Development of a self-interested military class or caste with great power in shaping public sentiment and historical interpretations of German traditions.
  - C. Alsace-Lorraine and the humiliation of France—alleged fear of a war of *revanche*.
  - D. Turning of Austrian interests towards the Balkans for "compensation" for losses in Germany.

Required:—

Hayes, II, pp. 202-3, 691-3; and Charles Seymour, *The Diplomatic Background of the War*, pp. 2-11.

2. German foreign policy and the isolation of France.
  - A. Devotion of German diplomacy to preservation of gains of 1870-71.
  - B. The Triple Alliance, 1879-82.
  - C. The "reinsurance treaties" of 1884 and 1887 with Russia.
  - D. English indifference when sea or colonial power was not involved.
  - E. Temporary success of the Bismarckian diplomacy.

Required:—

S. B. Harding, *The Study of the Great War, A Topical Outline*, pp. 13-14; and Hayes, II, pp. 692-7; or Hazen, pp. 319-22; or Schapiro, pp. 684-90; and *A League of Nations*, Vol. I, No. 4, April, 1918, pp. 176-86; and Seymour, pp. 12-37, 115-39; or Arthur Bullard, *The Diplomacy of the Great War*, pp. 13-23; or A. C. Coolidge, *The Origins of the Triple Alliance*, *passim*.

3. German *Weltpolitik*.
  - A. The Industrial Revolution in Germany.
    - (1) Professor Veblen's interpretation.

Required:—

Hayes, II, pp. 416-17; and Schapiro, pp. 297-306; or F. A. Ogg, *The Economic Development of Modern Europe*, pp. 218-34; or Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, pp. 82-3; 144-203.

- B. Influence of German industrial development in stimulating the new German imperialism.

Required:—

Hayes, II, pp. 547-60; and Seymour, pp. 61-78; and Schapiro, pp. 306-7.

- C. Chancellor Hohenlohe and a "forceful" German world policy, 1894-1900.

- (1) The mystic and sentimental attraction of the sea for Emperor William II.

D. Lateness of German entry into the "colonial scramble."

- (1) Great divergence between extent of German colonial holdings and the relative prestige of Germany on the European continent.

Required:—

Hayes, II, pp. 412-13; and Schapiro, pp. 308-12; and Seymour, pp. 80-88; and G. Lowes Dickinson, *The European Anarchy*, pp. 37-45; and Bullard, pp. 54-60.

Suggested:—

Bullard, pp. 178-205; H. A. Gibbons, *The New Map of Europe*, pp. 40-47; and Walter Lippman, *The Stakes of Diplomacy*, pp. 87-159.

E. German *Weltpolitik* and the birth of the German navy.

- (1) Beginnings of English apprehension and of Anglo-German tension.

Required:—

Hayes, II, pp. 422-3; and Seymour, pp. 78-80; and Schapiro, pp. 312-13; and Bullard, pp. 54-68; or R. H. Fife, *The German Empire Between Two Wars*, pp. 50-71.

Suggested:—

Dickinson, pp. 68-77; Holt and Chilton, *European History, 1862-1914*, pp. 299-302; and B. E. Schmitt, *England and Germany, 1740-1914*, pp. 139-218.

F. *Weltpolitik* and the diplomatic crises, 1890-1914.

(1) Africa.

- a. Adjustment with Great Britain, 1890.
- b. Revival of Anglo-German tension in the Boer War.
- c. Morocco and tension with the French.
  - (1) Tangier and the Algeciras Congress, 1905-6.
  - (2) The Casablanca affair, 1908.
  - (3) The Agadir incident, 1911. The Franco-German convention November, 1911.

Required:—

Harding, pp. 14-16; and Hayes, II, pp. 704-6; or Schapiro, pp. 687-90, 700-2; and Dickinson, pp. 108-15; and Seymour, pp. 170-76; 181, 186-192; or Gibbons, pp. 71-85; or Bullard, pp. 84-110, 118-23.

- (2) The Near Eastern Question—the *Drang nach Osten* and the Bagdad Railroad project.

- a. The identity of German-Austrian interests in securing the domination of the Balkans and of Turkey.
- b. The *Mittel-Europa* plan.



- c. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in 1908.
- (1) Violation of the Treaty of Berlin, (1878), and affront to Russia.
  - (2) Humiliation of Russia and Russian plans for revenge
- d. The Bagdad Railroad and the conflict with England.
- (1) Germany ousts England as the protector of the Porte.
  - (2) Danger to British India of a German port and naval base on the Persian Gulf.
  - (3) Peaceful solution of the dispute, June, 1914.

Required:—

Schapiro, pp. 702-8; and Schmitt, pp. 253-301; and *Conquest and Kultur*, pp. 52-66 (and map); and *The Lichnowsky Memorandum*, Notes, pp. 395-7; and Morris Jastrow, *The War and the Bagdad Railroad*, pp. 82-121; and Bullard, pp. 110-18.

Suggested:—

Bullard, pp. 65-8, 196; Dickinson, pp. 101-8; Gibbons, pp. 58-70, 368-71; Seymour, pp. 85-87; *The President's Flag Day Address*, pp. 14-24. F. Naumann, *Central Europe*.

- G. *Weltpolitik*, Pan-Germanism, Junkerdom, and the struggle against liberalism in Germany.
- (1) Union of new captains of industry with the agrarians or "Junkers."
  - (2) Identity of their interests in promoting militarism, autocracy, and a vigorous world policy.
  - (3) Their organizations.
    - a. The Pan German League—*Der Alldeutsche Verband*, 1890.
    - b. The League of Landlords—*Der Bund der Landwirte*, 1893.
    - c. The Navy League—*Der Deutsche Flottenverein*, 1898.
    - d. The National Security League—*Der Nationale Wehrverein*, 1911.
  - (4) Their propaganda and their influence on the government.
    - a. Military and naval policy.
    - b. Extension of Germanism in foreign lands.
    - c. Financial and taxation policies.
    - d. Repression of non-German nationalities.
    - e. Overthrow of chancellors.
    - f. Opposition to liberalism and constitutionalism.
    - g. Subordination of the civil power to the military.
    - h. War-scare shibboleths and catch phrases:—"encirclement," "jealous England," "barbarous Russia," "revengeful France."

(5) The challenge to the above tendencies in the growth of German liberalism—1907-1914.

- a. This as great a threat to the military party as the encircling alliances.

Required:—

Harding, pp. 5-9, 22-4; and Hayes, II, pp. 410, 417-19, 420, 423; and Schapiro, pp. 314-17, 321-3; and Bullard, pp. 24-35; and Seymour, pp. 89-106; and Dickinson, pp. 46-57; and O. Nippold, *The Awakening of the German People*, pp. 135-9; and *Conquest and Kultur*, pp. 86-94.

Suggested:—

*Conquest and Kultur*, passim; Bernhardt, *Germany and the Next War*, passim; C. Altschul, *German Militarism and Its German Critics*, pp. 8-20; E. E. Sperry, *The Tentacles of the German Octopus in America*; Monroe Smith, *Military Strategy and Statecraft*, pp. 204-52; Baron Beyens, *Germany Before the War*, pp. 106-37; J. W. Gerard, *My Four Years in Germany*, pp. 75-103, 111-128; W. S. Davis, *The Roots of the War*, pp. 162-93, 345-73.

#### VII. THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE REACTION TO THE EFFORT AT GERMAN HEGEMONY

1. Reversal of German foreign policy by William II in regard to Russia.
  - A. Bismarck's criticism.
2. Early success at an Anglo-German adjustment which was disrupted by German colonial ambitions and German naval policy.
3. The Franco-Russian agreement, 1892.
4. The Anglo-French *Entente Cordiale*, 1904.
5. The British-Japanese (1902); Franco-Italian (1902); Franco-Spanish (1904); and Russo-Japanese (1910) agreements.
6. The Triple-Entente, 1907.
7. The isolation of Germany—Delcassé as the "Nemesis of Bismarck."
8. Resulting strengthening of the Austro-German alliance and the *Mittel-Europa* scheme.

Required:—

Harding, pp. 13-14; and Hayes, II, pp. 697-703; and Schapiro, pp. 690-3; and George Louis Beer, *The English Speaking Peoples*, pp. 91-121; and Seymour, pp. 140-65; or Bullard, pp. 69-83; or *A League of Nations*, vol. I, No. 4, April, 1918, pp. 192-214.

#### VIII. THE ATTEMPT TO BRING ABOUT UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION—A POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL CHALLENGE TO THE MILITARY HEGEMONY OF GERMANY

1. The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907.
  - A. Convening agencies.

- B. Proposals.
- C. Attitude of several countries.
  - (1) German refusal to consider disarmament.
- D. Achievements of the Hague Conferences.
  - (1) Precedent and a permanent international court of arbitration.
- 2. The evident hopelessness of inducing Germany to join in, and cooperate with, the anti-militaristic movement.
  - A. German refusal to accept Minister Van Dyke's proposal for a third Hague Conference.

Required:—

Harding, pp. 9-10; Hayes, II, pp. 679-91; and Schapiro, pp. 693-9 and Dickinson, pp. 75-91.

Suggested:—

J. B. Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences*; Henry Van Dyke, *Fighting for Peace*, pp. 3-47.

#### IX. GERMANY AND THE WAR OF 1914

- 1. The two great aims of the governing classes in Germany.
  - A. Repression of political liberalism and anti-militarism at home.
  - B. The realization of the Pan-German and *Mittel-Europa* programs in foreign politics.
- 2. The two great obstacles to these ambitions.
  - A. The remarkable growth of liberalism and social democracy in Germany.
  - B. The diplomatic isolation of Germany and its threat to German *Weltpolitik*.
    - (1) The value of an immediate European war in crushing domestic liberalism and foreign opposition.
    - (2) Manifest impossibility of successfully coping with either of these if the conflict was delayed for a decade.
- 3. The challenge to the program of the German governing classes.
  - A. The Triple Entente.
  - B. The Rise of the Balkan nationalities.
  - C. The Jugo-Slav movement and Serbian leadership.
  - D. The alarming growth of social democracy in Germany in spite of archaic suffrage restrictions.
  - E. All of these come to a focus in 1912 in the German elections and the Balkan wars.
    - (1) The great socialist vote.
    - (2) The defeat of Turkey.

Required:—

Harding, pp. 16-17; and Schapiro, pp. 318-21; and Dickinson, pp. 105-8; and Gibbons, pp. 142-60, 263-367; or Hayes, II, pp. 515-39; or Bullard, pp. 124-149; or Seymour, pp. 194-244.

4. The plans and efforts of Germany and Austria to strengthen their position.
  - A. The common interest of Germany and Austria in combatting the rise of Balkan nationalism.
  - B. Austria leads in combatting the Jugo-Slav movement and Germany in crushing domestic liberalism.
    - (1) The bullying of Serbia by Austria in 1908 and 1912-13.
    - (2) The campaign of the military-autoeratic party in Germany, 1912-14.
      - a. Attempt to terrorize the masses by the "encirelement theory."
        - (1) Belgian and French expert opinion on the attitude of the German people before 1913.
      - b. Theory of a "preventive war" supersedes that of a "defensive war."
      - c. Attempt to develop a patriotic and military atmosphere through great patriotic celebrations glorifying the military past and Hohenzollern traditions of Germany.
        - (1) The peculiarly propitious circumstances for such a patriotic demonstration.
          - (a) The 100th anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig.
          - (b) The 25th Anniversary of the accession of William II.
        - (2) The subsidizing of orators and sculptors.
        - (3) The resulting hysteria generated in the mass of the German people.
        - (4) Evidences of the control of the military class in 1913 and early months of 1914.

Required:—

Dickinson, pp. 57-68, 116-33; Harding, pp. 22-24; and *Conquest and Kultur*, pp. 106-36; and Seymour, pp. 238-44; and Hayes, II, pp. 425-6, 526, 707-8; and Gerard, pp. 103, 388-402.

Suggested:—

Altschul, pp. 20-36; J. B. Scott, *Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War*, vol. I, pp. 547-554; *The War Message and the Facts Behind It*, p. 17; Gibbons, pp. 357-60; 368-74; Hazen, *Alsace Lorraine under German Rule*, pp. 189-214; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 136-43; Monroe Smith, pp. 252-68; Baron Beyens, *Germany Before the War*, pp. 177-202, 355-64.

5. Germany and the outbreak of the war.
  - A. Evidence that a leading purpose of the German war party in desiring an immediate war was the desire to submerge all classes and parties in a common sentiment of patriotism and loyalty to the established order and dynasty—i. e. to nourish the prestige of autoeracy and militarism by new Sadowas and Sedans.

- (1) German foreign policy in a more satisfactory condition than at any time since retirement of Bismarck.
    - a. By June, 1914, all outstanding colonial disputes had been settled.
    - b. Germany's traditional enemies in the most weakened condition for a quarter of a century.
  - (2) Violent opposition of radicals and socialists to the military demonstrations and preparations in 1913-14.
  - (3) All other methods of repressing the growth of German liberalism had failed.
  - (4) The military and autocratic party seemed likely to lose all by continued peace and might win a new lease of life by duplicating the feats of Moltke and Bismarck. (cf. Gerard, p. 103.)
- B. The Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and their menace to the *Mittel-Europa* project.
- (1) German chagrin at collapse of Turkey.
  - (2) The unsatisfactory nature of the Treaty of Bucharest to the Central Powers.
    - a. Threat to Austro-Hungarian interests in the Balkans.
    - b. Danger to German interests in Turkey and Asia Minor.
      - (1) Concessions in Asia Minor would be of little value if Germany were cut off from direct communication with this district.
  - (3) Evident determination of Germany and Austria to readjust the Balkan situation according to their interests at the earliest possible opportunity.
    - a. Preparation for the appearance of a satisfactory "incident."
- C. Evidence that the Austro-Serbian crisis was but a welcome pretext for aggressive action previously planned by the German military leaders.
- (1) Secret instructions regarding increase of German army, March 19, 1913.
  - (2) Austrian proposal to Italy that Serbia be attacked, August 9, 1913.
  - (3) Army bill of June 30, 1913, increasing size of German army on an unprecedented scale.
  - (4) Fortification of the Kiel Canal.
  - (5) Restriction of exportation of materials used in manufacture of munitions of war.
  - (6) Recall of reservists from foreign countries.
  - (7) Great manoeuvres planned for 1914 which would mass 500,000 men on the French frontier.
  - (8) Aiding plots for rebellion in the British Empire.

(9) Pacifists and pro-German propaganda subsidized in foreign countries.

(10) War measures for coaling of German naval vessels June, 1914

(11) Alleged German industrial mobilization order, June, 1914.

Required:—

Harding, pp. 19-28; Hayes, II, pp. 536-9; and Bullard, pp. 150-160; and Schmitt, pp. 382-88; and Seymour, pp. 245-53; or Holt and Chilton, pp. 524-61; or Gibbons, pp. 343-98.

D. German responsibility for the failure to adjust the Austro-Serbian crisis of July 1914 by diplomacy and arbitration.

(1) The "shining armor" precedent of 1908.

(2) The Potsdam Conference of July 5, 1914 and the decision of the German military chiefs for the precipitation of a European war.

(3) German inciting of Austria to attack Serbia and German refusal to urge Austria to accept mediation.

(4) Germany prevents Austria from accepting the plans for European discussion.

a. Austria weakens on August 1, 1914 and offers to submit the Serbian dispute to European conversations.

b. Germany forestalls the possibility of a peaceful adjustment by arrogant ultimatums and summary declaration of war on Russia.

Required:—

Harding, pp. 29-41; and Schapiro, pp. 709-22; and Seymour, pp. 254-87; or Gibbons, pp. 374-98.

Suggested:—

O. P. Chitwood, *The Immediate Causes of the Great War*, passim; E. C. Stowell, *The Diplomacy of the War of 1914*, passim.

(5) The antecedents of the outbreak of the war as presented in the Memorandum of Prince Karl Maximilian Lichnowsky, which appeared in the spring of 1918.

a. The German ambassador in England in 1914 places complete responsibility for the war on the German military party.

Required:—

*The Lichnowsky Memorandum*, edited with Notes by Monroe Smith and Henry F. Munro.

(6) The Mühlton Memoranda.

a. Dr. Wilhelm Mühlton, a director of the Krupp works tells of foreknowledge of the projected war by German industrial and financial leaders early in July, 1914.

Required:—

*The American Journal of International Law*, April, 1918, pp. 397-99. *The Memoranda and Letters of Dr. Mühlton*, edited by Monroe Smith.

6. German violation of international law and the shift of neutral opinion against Germany.
  - A. The invasion of Belgium.
  - B. The occupation of Luxemburg.
  - C. Use of forbidden methods of warfare.
  - D. Terrorism and cruelties to conquered populations.
  - E. Unrestricted submarine warfare.
  - F. Practical repudiation of *Kultur* and *Deushtum* by the civilized world, as long as they are linked with Prussian militarism, *realpolitik* and autocracy.
    - (1) German losses through violation of international law.
    - (2) Has *realpolitik* "paid" in the "final reckoning"?

Required:—

Harding, pp. 42-51, 54-63; and Schapiro, pp. 714-17; and Gibbons, pp. 399-412; or Monroe Smith, pp. 171-200.

Suggested:—

*German War Practices; German Treatment of Conquered Territory.*

